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Abstract: This paper examines the government revenue–expenditure nexus for the Free State Province 
in a multivariate modelling framework using real GDP and inflation as control variables over the period 
2004Q2–2018Q1. Cointegration and intertemporal (causal) links among variables were established 
employing Johansen-Juselius (1990) within a vector error correction model (VECM) and Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) non-Granger causality test. Cointegration analysis affirms the existence of a long-
run relationship between variables. The results of the causal analyses show a bidirectional causality 
between government revenues and expenditures in both the long-run and short-run, supporting the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis. Real GDP and inflation individually Granger-causes government revenues 
in both the long-run and short-run, stressing their importance on generating revenue. Based on these 
findings, an isolated fiscal measure to raise tax-revenues or cut expenditure will exacerbate fiscal 
imbalance. The Free State government through its provincial treasury should adhere to a planned budget 
process, devise innovative revenue-generating strategies to circumvent the burden of producing 
inflation revenue, and effectively use its autonomy on fiscal instruments to maintain a sustainable fiscal 
policy path and stimulate economic activity level.   
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1. Introduction.  
 
In the aftermath of the latest global economic and financial crisis, the South African government 
have been grappling with an expanding fiscal debt (as a ratio of GDP) due to government expenditures 
outpacing tax-revenues (Figs. 1 and 2 in the Appendix), while economic growth is constrained with 
structural endogenous shocks (e.g., shortage of power supply), political uncertainty, weak global 
demand for commodity export and gyrations in the world capital market. At the same time, the labour 
market condition has steadily worsened in the past decade1. The combined effects of these developments 
require the national government to design/ implement effective economic and fiscal policies to tackle 
these socioeconomic issues and stimulate economic growth (see, e.g., NDP, 2012; NGP, 2011). While, 
in political and academic discussions, there is a growing concern over South Africa’s ever-increasing 
fiscal debt utilized to finance the rise in government expenditures, which in turn widen budget deficit 
(National Treasury, 2020).  
Intuitively, the narrowing fiscal space, severely weak economic growth and relatively low tax-
revenues may affect the national government’s allocations (i.e., equitable shares2) to provinces directly 
or indirectly. Hence, provincial governments are often confronted with the dilemma of either reducing 
public spending or utilize their fiscal autonomy to raise “own revenue” to augment their provincial 
                                                    
1South Africa’s fiscal debt (as % of GDP), a key measure of national government’s indebtedness and financial 
health has nearly doubled in size from 31.8% in 1990 to 59.3% at the end of 2019 (National Treasury, 2020), even 
as its economic growth drastically slowdown to about 0.7% at end of 2019 from the recorded 4.2% in 2000 (IMF, 
2020).The country is also experiencing a persistently high unemployment rate at 29.1% (narrowed definition) or 
42.3% (expanded definition) at the end of 2019 (StatsSA, 2020). 
2South African uses an intergovernmental fiscal framework, in which, collected tax-revenue by the national 
government are allocated as equitable shares (to fund both earmarked and conditional grants) across the nine 
provinces based on set of criterion.     
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equitable share (PES). Nevertheless, a key question is which of these budgetary components will 
actually foster fiscal sustainability or restore fiscal balance?. The answer to this question cannot be 
based on a priori judgement but it remains an empirical issue.  
In South Africa, the provincial governments receive a large fraction of their revenue (i.e., PES) 
from the national government in the form of intergovernmental transfers which are mostly devoted to 
financing flagship programmes or projects identified by the national government to show its political 
commitment to the voters, on tackling income inequality, unemployment and poverty rate. This gives 
the assumption that provincial governments operate under a balanced budget, which becomes 
questionable due to off-budget activities deemed as the main priority in a particular province (Payne, 
1998). In this context, the fiscal autonomy of the provincial governments becomes crucial to generate 
extra revenue to fund off-budget activities (or provincial financial priorities) by either raising levies and 
surcharges3. Albeit, a priori decision by the policymakers either to raise tax-revenue or cut expenditure 
to finance current spending (or budget deficit) can lead to serious budget constraints which may 
indirectly dampen economic activity level or induce inflationary pressures in the domestic economy.  
However, a better understanding of the dynamic interrelationship between government revenue 
and expenditures would aid policymakers to pin down the causes of, and remedies for, non-credible 
budget. From a policy standpoint, such knowledge could also be useful in designing and/or 
implementing appropriate fiscal measures to improve the budget planning process, achieve fiscal 
sustainability and reduce budget deficit. Besides, it is widely accepted that sound fiscal policy can 
promote price stability and sustain growth in output and employment. As a policy tool, it can reduce 
output and employment fluctuations in the short-run, and also restore the economy to its potential level. 
This present study contributes to the extant literature investigating the causal relationship between 
government revenues and expenditures at the state level, by focusing on the temporal interdependence 
between the two variables in the domestic economy of the Free State (FS) province over the period over 
the period 2004Q2–2018Q1 employing the vector error correction modelling approach and VAR-based 
non-Granger causality test developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995), together with real gross domestic 
product (GDP)4 and inflation as control variables within a multivariate framework.  
This empirical analysis is timely and important in at least on two counts. Firstly, the economic and 
labour market conditions in the FS province mirrors that of the national economy given a relatively high 
unemployment rate of 35% (narrow definition) or 37% (expanded definition) at the end of 20195, and 
a lacklustre domestic economy that recorded negative growth of -0.3% in 2019 compared to the growth 
rate of 2% and 2.5% in 2000 and 2010 respectively6.  Premised on this reality, the provincial government 
is faced with the daunting task of resuscitating the provincial economy and concurrently reduce the 
prevailing high rate of unemployment and poverty rates with the limited available financial resources 
which constitute the bulk of the equitable shares allocated by the national government.  
On the other hand, the enforcement of stringent fiscal consolidation measures by the South African 
government, to reduce the increasing fiscal debt, budget deficit, wasteful expenditures and public wage 
bill, has an unintended indirect effect on the Free State’s equitable share, while the increasing off-the 
budget activities to ameliorate the impact of the emergent dire socioeconomic conditions makes the 
provincial budget fiscally unsustainable. Given the current socio-economic and fiscal challenges; the 
Free State government is obliged to use its fiscal autonomy to explore innovative measures to either 
generate more revenue to finance the provincial needs or reduce its expenditures to achieve fiscal 
balance. Hence, the findings on the underlying dynamic interrelationship between government revenues 
and expenditure will shed more light on whether the conventional fiscal measure to raise tax-revenues 
(on levies and surcharges) or cut expenditures or concurrently use both measures will revive the 
provincial economy as well as mitigate budget constraints due to higher expenditures and low revenue 
(Fig.3 in the Appendix). 
                                                    
3Levies and surcharges are other form of taxes used by the provincial (or state) government as fiscal tools to raise 
‘own’ revenue. Note, the provincial ‘own’ revenue is referred to as government revenue from Sections 3 to 6. 
4Note, GDP variable that is used in our analysis refers to the GDP-R that measures the provincial economic 
growth, calculated and published by the Statistics South Africa (StatsSA).   
5See, StatSA’s published Quarterly Labour Market Survey for 2019:Q4.  
6Provincial macroeconomic data is sourced from the reliable IHS Global Markit’s Rex database.     
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Secondly, the relationship between government revenues-expenditures empirically rests on four 
hypotheses in the public finance literature7, which includes (i) tax-spend, (ii) spend-tax, (iii) fiscal 
synchronization, and (iv) institutional separation. While the first three hypotheses imply interconnection 
between government revenue and expenditures (see, e.g. Friedman, 1978; Buchanan and Wagner, 1979; 
Musgrave, 1966; Meltzer and Richard, 1981), the institutional separation hypothesis suggests an 
independent relationship between these budgetary components (Wildavsky, 1988; Baghestani and 
McNown, 1994). These theories have different policy implications. This, it is imperative for both the 
fiscal authorities and policymakers in the Free State province to have in-depth knowledge of the exact 
theoretical relationship underlying the government revenue-expenditure nexus in the province. This 
rationale lends credence to the relevance of the empirical investigation in this paper. Concrete evidence 
on the theory underpinning the revenues-expenditures nexus in the Free State will be useful to the fiscal 
authorities and policymakers in designing (or implementing) effective fiscal measures to finance other 
provincial priorities. 
This paper also contributes to the extant literature in several dimensions. So far, only a few studies 
have examined the causal relationship between government revenue and expenditures in South Africa 
from the national government perspective (see, e.g., Chang et al.2002; Narayan and Narayan, 2006; 
Lusiyan and Thorthon, 2007; Nyamongo et al.2007; Ghartey, 2010; Ndahiriwe and Gupta, 2010; 
Baharumshah et al.2016; Phiri, 2019), however the same empirical research on the provincial economy8 
remain scarce.  To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt to explore this line of 
empirical inquiry at the sub-national sphere of government in South Africa.   
Furthermore, the findings in the existing literature for South Africa is inconclusive, as authors 
report contradictory evidence supporting a unidirectional causality running from government 
expenditures to revenue (see, Chang et al.2002); no temporal causal link between variables, indicative 
of fiscal neutrality (Narayan and Narayan, 2006) and bidirectional causality between variables (see, 
e.g., Phiri, 2019; Baharumshah et al.2016; Ghartey, 2010; Lusiyan and Thorthon, 2007). Thus, it is 
difficult for policymakers to design and/or implement effective fiscal measures to reduce the budget 
deficit or achieve fiscal sustainability in South Africa. Aside from, the different econometric techniques 
used in earlier studies and time-periods examined; the mixed results reported in most of the earlier 
studies can be attributed to cointegration and causality analyses were carried out in a bivariate 
framework which suffers from the omitted variable problem (see, e.g., Payne, 2003; Baghestani and 
McNown, 1994; Ashan et al. 1992; Signh and Sani, 1984, Lutkepohl, 1982); widespread use of low 
frequency (annual) data, as opposed to high-frequency data, has been proven to obscure the existing 
causative links between revenue and expenditures (Ndahriwe and Gupta, 2010); and structural breaks 
are often unaccounted for in the annual data used (save for Phiri, 2019; Lusiyan and Thorton), despite 
the increasing exposure of South Africa to globally transmitted shocks due to the country’s well 
documented increasing integration into the world economy and financial markets since 1994.  Likewise, 
several fiscal measures have been adopted to encourage fiscal discipline and financial management at 
the national, provincial and municipal levels9.  
Broadly speaking, the shortcomings in these earlier studies can lead to erroneous conclusions and 
fiscal policy formulation,  given that the relationship between government revenue and expenditure may 
have changed because of the close link between business cycles and the budget working via automatic 
fiscal stabilizers and discretionary fiscal measures (Ewing, 2006:191), thus the failure to determine 
possible endogenous breaks (and deterministic trend) in the revenue and expenditure series can produce 
spurious results and conclusion on causal links (Islam, 2001).  
                                                    
7The different tax-debate theories, empirical evidence and policy implications are discussed in subsequent section 
of this paper.  
8Note, South African provinces are analogous to states in other countries/regions. See, e.g., Saunoris (2015), Payne 
(1998), Marlow and Manage (1987) and Von Furstenburg et al.(1986) for studies investigating the government 
revenues-expenditures nexus at the state levels. See, also Payne (2003) for few studies that focused on the temporal 
relationship between government revenues and expenditures at the state and local government (municipality) 
levels. 
9 Enacted financial regulations, most notably Public Finance Management Amendment Act (PFMA), No. 29 of 
1999 and Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) No. 56 of 2003, enforced by the National Treasury.  
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Most closely related to our work is Kavase and Phiri (2018), who investigate the fiscal 
sustainability across the nine South African provinces focusing on the existing asymmetric relationship 
between government revenue–expenditure. Even so, the drawn inferences and conclusion of this 
particular study can be considered as unreliable since the analytical exercise is performed in a bivariate 
model using high-frequency data that covers the period 2000 to 2016. Also, the short time-period 
covered in this study makes it susceptible to misspecification bias due to insufficient degrees of 
freedom, required to construct the optimal number of lags for times-series included in the non-linear 
autoregressive model (NARDL) used.     
The methodology and model specification employed in this study circumvent the limitations of 
earlier studies. Specifically, our causality analysis is carried out in a multivariate cointegration-based 
error correction model using high-frequency data (i.e., quarterly series) with real GDP and inflation as 
control variables, to effectively deal with misspecification bias associated with omitted variable 
problems and spurious conclusions on the nature and direction of causality. Foremost, the cointegration-
based error correction model employed allows feedback between government revenue and expenditure 
running interactively through the real GDP and inflation variables in both the short-run and long-run 
(Granger and Lin, 1995; Johansen and Juselieus, 1990). Second, the error terms from the long-run 
regressions between government revenue, expenditure, real GDP and inflation can give more insight 
into how, for instance, responsive revenues and expenditures are to deviations from their long-run 
equilibriums with respect to GDP.  It is worth noting that the inclusion of the provincial real GDP in 
our model is due to the fact that the provincial government ‘own’ revenue and expenditure growth are 
intrinsically linked to the aggregate economic conditions in the province. Finally, the novel Toda-
Yamamoto non-Granger causality test used in our analysis provides a reliable robustness check for the 
results of the estimated vector error correction models on the long-run relationship among variables. 
All in all, our drawn inferences and conclusion on both the linear and temporal causative links among 
variables are expected to be more robust than those reported in earlier studies.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the different theories 
explaining the government revenue-expenditures nexus, empirical evidence supporting these theories, 
and a synoptic survey of relevant studies. Section 3 outlines the econometric techniques employed. Data 
and stationarity properties of the time-series are presented in Section 4. Empirical results are reported 
and discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes with some policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Theories on Government Revenues–Expenditure Nexus and Empirical Evidence.   
 
In public finance, four theoretical postulations underpin the government revenue–expenditure 
nexus (or the tax-spend debate) and important for the formulation of fiscal policy, these include: (i) the 
tax-spend, (ii) spend-tax, (iii) fiscal synchronization and (iv) institutional separation. A bird’s eye view 
of the burgeoning empirical literature validating these theories is provided in this sub-section, and 
relevant empirical studies are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. See, for example, Payne (2003) 
and Phiri (2019) for a much broader survey of the empirical literature. 
Friedman (1978) and Buchanan and Wagner (1997) are the main proponents of the tax-spend 
theory, arguing that changes in government revenues (taxes) leads to changes in government 
expenditure, from an opposing viewpoint. According to Friedman (1978), an increase in government 
revenues will directly raise government expenditures, implying a positive relationship between the 
variables. For example, the conventional fiscal measure to reduce budget deficits by increasing tax-
revenue will exert an inflationary effect on goods and services, which raises government consumption 
expenditure. On this basis, lower taxes would reduce the budget deficit or engender fiscal sustainability 
(Darrat, 2002; Payne, 2003). On the contrary, Buchanan and Wagner (1997) posit a negative 
intertemporal relationship between government revenue and expenditure. Here, an increase in 
government revenue (or tax) will reduce the budget deficit,  since voters will perceive a reduction in 
tax revenue as a decline in public spending, leading to increasing demand for public goods and services. 
Thus, increases in tax revenues combined with spending cuts will lower budget deficits. Empirically, a 
unidirectional causality from government revenues (or taxes) to government expenditure confirms the 
tax-spend thesis.  The tax-spend hypothesis has been supported by the following empirical studies, to 
mention a few: Manage and Marlow (1986), Ram (1988), Bohn (1991), Owoye (1995), Ross and Payne 
 5 
 
(1995), Payne (1998), Park (1998), Ewing and Payne (1998), Daratt (1998), Narayan and Narayan 
(2006), Kollias and Paleologou (2006), Wolde-Rufael (2008), AbuAl-Foul and Baghestani (2004), Eita 
and Mbazima (2008), Aregbeyen and Ibrahim (2012), Sennoga (2012), Magazzino (2013), Rahman and 
Wadud (2014), and Obeng (2015).  
Tuning to the spend-tax theory, government spend first and raise revenue (taxes) later, which is 
the opposite of the tax-spend thesis. Peacock and Wiseman (1961, 1979) advanced spend-tax theory, 
arguing that the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., natural disaster, droughts) economic, social 
and political upheavals typically leads to higher taxes initially used to finance the required increase in 
government expenditure. This postulation is akin to Ricardian equivalence proposition by Barro (1974, 
1978) suggesting that the present borrowing by government results in an increased tax liability in the 
future, hence government expenditure is fully capitalised by the public in recognition of these increased 
future tax liabilities. Empirically, the spend-and-tax hypothesis holds if a unidirectional causality from 
government spending to government revenue (taxes) exists and is known as the ‘displacement effect’. 
The spend-tax theory has been supported by the work of, for example, Blackley (1986), Von 
Furstenburg et al. (1986), Jones and Joulifain (1991), Payne (1998), Afonso and Rault (2009), 
Magazzino (2013), Chang et al. (2002), Narayan and Narayan (2006), Saunoris and Payne (2010), Keho 
(2011), Paleologou (2013), Kaya and Şen (2013), Ritcher and Dimitrios (2013), Nwosu and Okafor 
(2014), and Tiwari and Mutascu (2016).  
Whereas, Musgrave (1966) and Meltzer and Richard (1981) put forward the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis, maintaining that government expenditures and taxes can be adjusted 
simultaneously (or concurrently) to achieve fiscal balance (or equilibrium) given that policymakers 
have full control on both variables during budget adjustments.  In theory, concurrent decisions on the 
appropriate government expenditure and tax revenues are imperative to optimize a community’s 
intertemporal social welfare function in a democratic society, as decisive voter also compares the 
marginal benefits and costs of initiated government programmes (Musgrave, 1966:19). Conversely, 
preferences of a community would determine the quantity and quality of public goods that government 
expenditure caters for, implying that the welfare-maximising choice of a decisive voter influence 
government expenditure level (or size), while the decisive voter chooses the tax share (Meltzer and 
Richard, 1981:924).  
Therefore, the government can simultaneously choose an optimal package of public programmes 
to be financed in its budget along with tax revenues required. Since government expenditure and 
revenue are independent of each other, budget deficit can be reduced by raising taxes and reducing 
expenditure since both variables can be changed concurrently. Empirically, a bidirectional (or 
contemporaneous feedback) causality between government revenues and government expenditures 
validates the fiscal synchronization theory. Hence, an isolated fiscal decision to raise government 
revenue or expenditure will lead to a serious budget deficit, if contemporaneous feedback exists between 
the two variables.  Empirical evidence on fiscal synchronisation theory have been reported by, for 
example, Manage and Marlow (1987), Miller and Rusek (1990), Owoye (1995), Payne (1998), Ewing 
and Payne (1998),  Islam (2001), Chang et al. (2002), Kollias and Paleologou (2006), Lusiyan and 
Thorthon (2007), Nyamogo et al. (2007), Wolde-Rufael (2008), Chang and Chiang (2009), Ndahiriwe 
and Gupta (2010), Ghartey (2010), Mehrara et al. (2011), Elyasi and Rahimi (2012), Al-zeaud (2015), 
Takumah (2014), Baharumshah et al. (2016), Phiri (2019) and Raza et al. (2019).  
Lastly, Wildavsky (1988) and Baghestani and McNown (1994) suggested the institutional 
separation hypothesis, under which decisions on government expenditure and taxation are taken 
independent of one another due to the conflicting views and interest of different parties or groups which 
causes fiscal debt to grow and makes it more challenging to implement deficit-reducing measures  
(Drazen, 2001; Persson et al. 2000). From a policy perspective, if institutional separation thesis holds, 
then fiscal consolidation out by raising tax revenues or cut in expenditure will not affect budget deficit 
(Lusiyan and Thorton, 2007:497). Empirically, no intertemporal causality between government revenue 
and expenditure is existing, and also referred to as fiscal neutrality. To mention a few, studies with 
findings on fiscal neutrality consists of the empirical work of AbuAl-Foul and Baghestani (2004), 
Narayan and Narayan (2006), Ewing (2006), Kollias and Paleologou (2006), Wolde-Rufael (2008), 
Zapf and Payne (2009), Magazzino (2013), Ali and Shah (2012), Masere and Kaja (2014), and 
Baharumshah et al. (2016). 
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2.1. Survey of related empirical studies    
 
In the vast empirical literature, empirical studies examining the relationship between government 
revenue and expenditure in South Africa is scanty, while similar research at the provincial level receives 
no attention so far. Be that as it may, the findings of these studies remain mixed, partly due to model 
specification bias, different time period being studied, and econometric techniques used.  
Some cross-sectional studies have considered South Africa in their analysis in a multivariate 
model by incorporating GDP as a control variable to deal with misspecification bias due to omitted 
variable problem (Payne, 2003). Most notably, Chang et al. (2002) employed the error correction 
modelling approach to assess the government revenue-expenditure nexus across ten developing 
economies using annual series, over the period 1951–1996 and finds a unidirectional causality running 
from government expenditure to revenue for South Africa in the short-run, supporting the spend-tax 
hypothesis. On the contrary, using the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) non-Granger causality test for twelve 
developing countries during the 1960–2000, Narayan and Narayan (2006) found no long-run causality 
between government revenue and expenditure in South Africa, keeping with the institutional separation 
(or fiscal neutrality) hypothesis. In a subsequent study, Ghartey (2010) utilised an ARDL model and 
the two-step Engle-Granger method to determine the direction of causality driving the government 
revenue-expenditure nexus in Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa using annual data spanning 1960–2007 
and found a bi-directional causality among these variables for South Africa suggesting the existence of 
fiscal synchronisation hypothesis.     
Similarly, few country-specific studies have considered the government revenue-expenditures 
nexus in South Africa. Among these, Lusiyan and Thorthon (2007) accounted for structural breaks by 
including dummy variables in bivariate model estimated for the period over the period 1895-2015 and 
established long-run relationship with the help of a VAR-based Johansen cointegration test. Their 
Granger-type causality tests suggest the existence of a bidirectional relation between revenue and 
expenditure, thus keeping with fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. Nyamongo et al. (2007) estimated a 
bivariate VAR model over the period October 1994 to June 2004 and reported a long-run bi-directional 
causality between government revenue to expenditure but without any evidence of temporal causal link 
which supports fiscal neutrality hypothesis. Ndahiriwe and Gupta (2010) argued that the mix results in 
the direction and nature of the causal relationship between government revenue and expenditure in 
South Africa can be attributed to the frequency of time-series used. Using both quarterly and annual 
together with GDP and government debt as control variables, the authors find bi-directional causality 
between revenue and expenditure only in the vector error correction model with quarterly data (1960Q1 
to 2006Q2) but the result of a similar model with annual series (1960-2005) showed no evidence on the 
causative links among variables being studied.  
More recent studies have utilized the asymmetric model to capture the non-linear features 
underlying government revenue and expenditure. In this strand of studies, Baharumshah et al. (2016) 
used annual data to estimate both asymmetric (i.e., threshold autoregression (TAR) and momentum 
threshold autoregression (MTAR)) and symmetric (error correction based-ARDL) bivariate 
cointegration models over the period 1960–2013 for South Africa and found no evidence of asymmetric 
cointegration among variables in both the TAR and MTAR, however, the results of the multivariate 
ARDL that make use of the GDP as control variable confirm that variables are linearly cointegrated in 
the long-run with bi-directional causality running from government revenue to expenditure, and vice 
versa in both the long-run and short-run.   
Focusing on fiscal sustainability of South African provinces given the adopted strict fiscal 
consolidation stance by National Treasury, Kavase and Phiri (2018) employ the non-linear ARDL 
model to examine the asymmetry relationship behind government revenue–expenditure nexus across 
nine provinces over the period 2000–2016, and finds that the widespread strict fiscal stance to finance 
growing expenditure by raising taxes (increased revenue collection) has a differentiated long-run and 
short-run effects on provincial budgets, and widens the national fiscal debt given varying financial 
priorities in each province.  These authors conclude that fiscal sustainability is attainable in both the 
long-run and short-run if government expenditures increased in Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and Free-
State provinces but reduced in Western Cape, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. 
Finally, in a recent empirical work,  Phiri (2019) make use of an asymmetric MTAR cointegration 
model supplemented with a TEC component with fiscal deficit/surplus (as a ratio of GDP) as a control 
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variable to examine the government revenue-expenditure nexus for South Africa over the period 
1960Q1 to 2016Q2, and finds a bi-directional causality, in support of fiscal synchronization hypothesis.  
 
 
3. Econometric Methodology:  Cointegration-based Vector Error Correction Modelling 
 
This sub-section outlines the econometric approaches employed to examine the relationship 
between government revenue and expenditures in the Free State province.  We begin with the 
construction of a hypothetical (functional) multivariate framework needed to study the existing linear 
and temporal relationships between provincial government ‘own’ revenue, expenditure and the two 
control variables. Next, we outline the cointegration based-vector error correction model and Toda-
Yamamoto’s MWALD tests based on the developed functional model to carried out the causal analysis 
between variables.    
 
3.1. Modelling Framework. 
 
In the empirical literature, the assessment of the government revenue–expenditure nexus in a 
multivariate framework has been proven to produce more robust results and conclusion, compared to a 
bivariate modelling approach, which may obfuscate the direction and pattern of temporal links among 
variables,  and misspecification bias associated with omitted variable problem (see, e.g., Payne, 2003; 
Lutkepohl, 1982)10. To this end, the underlying dynamically complex government revenue (GR)–
government expenditure (GE) nexus is investigated at the sub-national level using provincial data by 
considering long-run linear stochastic equations within a multivariate framework as follows:   
 0 1 2 3 1 2 1ln lnt t t t t t tGR GE Y g d               (1) 
 0 1 2 3 3 4 2ln lnt t t t t t tGE GR Y g d                (2) 
where, ln is the logarithm operator; 1 2 3 1 2, , , ,      and 3  are coefficients to be estimated; tGE
and tGR  denotes real government expenditure and revenue; tY  and t  are the real gross domestic 
product (GDP) and inflation series included as control variables to pin down the exact intertemporal 
(causal) relationship among variables; itg  and itd  are dummy variables to account for possible 
structural breaks in the series owed to important external (global) and internal (domestic) shocks; while 
1t  and 2t are serially uncorrelated error terms (white-noise).  
The motivation behind the specified models are as follows: First, the specified models lend 
credence to the theoretical underpinnings driving the GR–GE nexus, given that Eq.1 modelled the 
spend-tax hypothesis (Peacock and Wiseman, 1961), while Eq.(2) represent the tax-spend hypothesis  
(Friedman, 1978). Second, this multivariate set-up allows feedback interaction between the independent 
and endogenous variables to accurately uncover the direction and the nature of causality underscoring 
the government revenue-expenditure nexus which cannot be determined purely a priori judgement. 
Third, the inclusion of important macro-variables, that is, the GDP and inflation as two control variables 
in the system help to obviate model misspecification bias11 since the failure to account for omitted 
variables can give rise to misleading causal ordering among variables, leading to spurious results (see, 
                                                    
10In the public finance literature, same evidence on dealing with misspecification bias due to omitted variable 
problems have been proven in related strand of empirical studies exploring the government expenditure–economic 
growth nexus, see, e.g., Signh and Sani (1984) and Ashan et al. (1992). 
11See, Payne (2003) for detailed survey on for cross-country and country-specific studies which have used GDP 
and inflation as control variables in a multivariate set-up. For instance, few studies focusing on the relationship 
between government revenue and expenditure in South Africa, most notably Chang et al.(2002), Narayan and 
Narayan (2006), Wolde-Rafael (2008), Ghartey (2010), and Baharumshah et al. (2016) used GDP as control 
variable in their estimated models.  
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Ahsan, Kwan and Sahni, 1992). Following the empirical work of Baghestani and McNown (1994), it 
has become a common practice to add a third variable, usually the GDP in a multivariate model. The 
inclusion of the GDP variable in the specified model allows us to account for the influence of the size 
of the provincial economy on the growth in both government revenue and expenditure, which in turn,  
are intrinsically dependent on the aggregate economic activity level. This modelling strategy also helps 
to distinguish between the direct causality relation between revenues and expenditures and the indirect 
causality effects via GDP and inflation. While, the error terms from the long-run regressions between 
government revenue and GDP (Eq.1) and government expenditure and GDP (Eq.2) could provide 
meaningful insight on the responsiveness and deviation of government revenues and expenditures from 
their long-run equilibriums with respect to GDP (Payne, 1998).   
Finally, the specified models permit clear identification of possible cointegrated vectors (long-
run relationships) in the system of equations, required for the inclusion of error-correction terms that 
could provide another source of causality in the long-run in the estimation of multivariate vector 
autoregressive models. Overall, estimated models in Eqs.1 and 2 allows us to correctly determine 
whether variables are cointegrated or not (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 1990),  direct and 
indirect causative processes in both the long-run and short-run (Granger and Lin, 1995; Engle and 
Granger, 1987). 
 
 
3.2. Testing for Long-run Relationship: Cointegration Approach.    
Before testing for the direction and pattern of the causative process driving the GR–GE nexus via 
the control variables within multivariate error correction modelling framework, the next step is to 
determine whether the chosen variables are cointegrated in the long-run by sharing a common trend, 
yielding one or more linear combinations variables that are stationary in levels irrespective of varying 
stationarity properties. However, variables may deviate in the short-run in response to a shock in a 
system but expected to revert to a steady-state (i.e., long-run equilibrium) since they share a common 
stochastic trend (Stock and Watson, 1988). Engle and Granger (1987) showed that if two nonstationary 
variables are cointegrated, then a vector autoregression in the first difference is misspecified.   
For our application, the VAR-based Johansen’s (1992, 1995) maximum likelihood reduced-rank 
procedure is applied. This procedure is preferred because it allows the estimation and identification of 
more than one cointegrating vector(s) in the multivariate system, and also have better small sample 
properties, and also permits feedback effect among variables, reflecting the interdependency among 
variables to yield robust cointegrating vectors compared to the traditional E-G two-step procedure that 
is limited to bivariate relationships. Lastly, the loss in terms of efficiency is minimal12 .  
The Johansen procedure is carried out to identify the rank of the cointegrating space, by determining 
the number of cointegrating vectors ( r ) in the parameter matrix  . Following Johansen (1995) and 
Johansen and Juselius (1990) on the reduced rank cointegration test, consider a VAR (2,1) with 
Gaussian errors expressed as: 
(1) ( 1) (2) ( 2) ( ) ( )... ;    =1,2,..., .t t t n t n ty A y A y A y u t T         (3) 
where, ty  is a 1m vector of endogenous variables (in our case, real government expenditure, 
revenue, GDP and inflation (in this case, N=4) in the system at time, t  and tu is . . . (0, )iid N  .  By 
taking first-differencing on the vector level, Eq.(3) becomes an error correction model estimated as:  
 (1) ( 1) (2) ( 2) ( 1) ( 1) 1... ;    =1,2,..., .t t t n t n t ty y y y y u t T               (4) 
where, (1) (2) ...i iI A A A         for 1,2..., 1,i n   and (1) (2) ( )1 ... nA A A        
                                                    
12See, e.g., Gonzalo (1994) and Kremers et al. (1992) on the superiority of Johansen reduced rank procedure in 
comparison to conventional Granger causality test.   
 9 
 
Note, the main focus of the Johansen reduced rank cointegration test is on matrix  , conveying the 
information about the long-run relationship between ty  variables (e.g., GE and GR).  The cointegration 
rank is derived employing the trace test statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistics based on a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test, with the trace test ( )trace defined as:  
 1
1
ˆ( ) log(1 )ntrace
i r
r T 
 
     (5) 
where, 1ˆ ˆ,...,r n   are the estimated n r  smallest eigenvalue. The null hypothesis, 0 :H  numbers 
of cointegrating vectors r  is tested against the alternative, 1 :H numbers of cointegrating vectors 
equal to .r  In contrast, the maximum eigenvalues test is defined as 
 max 1ˆ( , 1) log(1 )rr r T        (6) 
The maximum eigenvalues test the null hypothesis, 0 :H  number of cointegrating vectors equals to r  
against the alternative, 1 :H  cointegrating vector is 1.r    In Eq.(5) and (6), i  are the estimated values 
of the characteristic roots obtained from the estimated   and T is the number of observations.   
3.3. Granger Causality Test: Error Correction Modelling Approach  
In what follows, temporal links between variables is established using the vector error correction 
model (VECM).  Generally, the presence of cointegration suggests the existence of, at least, one 
unidirectional causal link among variables (Granger, 1988). Based on this hypothesis and multivariate 
framework specified in Eqs. (1) and (2); the cointegrated error correction models investigating the long-
run and temporal dynamics behind the GR–GE nexus, in which government revenue and expenditure 
are each treated as the independent variable are estimated as:  
 
31 2 4
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
ln ln ln ln ln
                          ln
hh h h
t i t i t i t i t
i i i i
t t
GR GR GE Y
ECM u
     

   
   

         
 
      (7) 
 
31 2 4
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1
1 1 1 1
2 1 2
ln ln ln ln ln
                      + ln
kk k k
t i t i t i t i t
i i i i
t t
GE GE GR Y
ECM v
     

   
   

         

      (8) 
Here,   is the first difference operator; i  and i  are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the 
model’s convergence to long-run equilibrium; h  and k  are optimal lag length;   and   measures 
fiscal disequilibrium and the speed of adjustment to restore the model to its steady-state (or equilibrium) 
in the presence of a shock to the system; and the 1( 1,2)itECM i  is one-period lagged error correction 
term derived from long-run relationship capturing short-run causative process. More importantly, the 
size and statistical significance of the lagged error correction term in the revenue and expenditure 
equations have important implications for policymaking, as it indicates how long it will take for each 
fiscal variable to return to long-run equilibrium in the aftermath of a shock to the system. 1tu  and 2tv
serially uncorrelated error terms, such that 1 2 1 2 1 2[ , ] 0,  [ , ] 0,   [ , ] 0t s t s t sE u u E v v E u v    for all 
.t s  Other variables are as defined previously. In Eqs. (7) and (8), short-run causality is based on the 
standard F  test statistics (WALD test), which assess the joint significance of the coefficients of the 
 10 
 
first differenced (and lagged) explanatory variables. A significant negative signed ECM affirms that 
variables are cointegrated, and statistically significant values of   and   confirms the presence of a 
long-run causality based on the significance of standard t -test, respectively. Note, in our application, 
estimated dummy variables accounting for structural breaks due to global or domestic shocks, are 
treated endogenously in the computed models in Eqs. (7) and (8).  
3.4.  Toda-Yamamoto Non-Granger causality Approach.   
To ensure the robustness of the direction and pattern of long-run causative process, we employed a 
more powerful Toda-Yamamoto (hereafter, T-Y) non-Granger causality introduced by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995). Unlike the traditional Engle-Granger causality test, the T-Y non-Granger causality 
test requires no pre-testing for the presence of unit-root and cointegration to establish causal links 
among variables. The T-Y procedure uses a modified Wald test (MWALD) to test the linear restrictions 
of the parameters of a standard VAR ( )k in levels, with k being the optimal lag length. The MWALD 
test based on the T-Y procedure converges in the distribution of 2  random variables with m degrees 
of freedom whether the series is I(0), I(1) or I(2) stationary or not cointegrated (Wolde-Rafael, 
2008:276).  
To implement the T-Y procedure, a standard VAR ( )k  augmented with a max( )thk d  order of 
integration is estimated, in the first step. The optimal lag length of k is selected with the help of 
information criteria (e.g., Schwartz Bayesian Criterion, SBC or Akaike information criterion, AIC) to 
determine the maximal order of integration, maxd  of variables treated endogenously, producing a 
standard VAR  with max( )thk d  order of integration, with the coefficients of the last lagged maxd being 
ignored (see, e.g., Caporale and Pittis,1999; Zapata and Rambaldi, 1997; Clark and Mizzra, 2006). In 
the final step, the direction of causality is determined by performing the MWALD test for linear or 
nonlinear restrictions on the first kVAR parameters. The application of the usual F-statistic test has 
asymptotic distribution where valid inference can be made.  
In our application, the T-Y procedure is performed by computing a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR)13 with the system of equations described as:  
 
 
max max max max
0 1 1
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln      
                 
k d k d k d k d
t i t i i t i i t i i t t
i i i i
GR GR GE Y           
   
           (9) 
 
max max max max
0 1 2
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
                
k d k d k d k d
t i t i i t i i t i i t t
i i i i
GE GE GR Y          
   
              (10) 
 
max max max max
0 1 3
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
                      
k d k d k d k d
t i t i i t i i t i i t t
i i i i
Y Y GR GE          
   
              (11) 
 
max max max max
0 1 1 4
1 1 1 1
ln ln ln ln
                      
k d k d k d k d
t i t i t i i t i i t t
i i i i
GR GE            
   
              (12) 
where, , ( 1,2,3,4)i t i   are serially independent random error terms with a mean of zero and a 
finite covariance matrix. All other variables and symbols remain the same as previously described in 
                                                    
13The SUR procedure remains valid in the absence of a long-run relationship among variables, as long as the order 
of integration does not exceed the true lag length of the model (see, T–Y, 1995:225).  
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the models estimated earlier. Given the systems of equations in Eqs. (9) and (10), the null hypothesis 
that GR  does not Granger-cause GE  can be denoted as: 0 : 0,  iH i k    , and GE does not 
Granger-cause GR as 0 : 0,  iH i k    . As explained earlier, note that the inclusion of tY and t  
as control variables to minimize the spurious relationship due associated with omitted variables 
which often renders inferences from bivariate tests on the revenue and expenditure nexus to become 
inconclusive, inconsistent and invalid.  Also, these control variables allow us to ascertain the exact 
direction of causality underlying the government revenue-expenditure nexus, consistent with the 
competing theories discussed previously. 
 
4. Data and Stationarity properties of series. 
 
Our estimated model consists of the natural logarithms of quarterly series on generated “own” 
revenue, total expenditure and gross domestic product for the Free State (FS) province, and consumer 
price index (CPI) for the period 2004Q2–2018Q1 (N = 56 observations)14. The fiscal data are primarily 
sourced from the South Africa Department of National Treasury15 and Free State Provincial Treasury’s 
In-Year-Monitoring (IYM) databases. Historical CPI series is obtained from Statistics South Africa 
(StatsSA)16, while the provincial gross domestic product (GDP-R) data is sourced from the IHS Global 
Markit’s REX database. Where necessary, nominal series are rebased to index (2010=100), transformed 
to real using the CPI, and seasonally adjusted applying ARIMA X–13 procedure. The real government 
revenue and expenditure series are rescaled as a ratio of real GDP17 to capture the effects of growth in 
the domestic provincial economy (Zapf and Payne, 2009), as their growth rates are reliant on economic 
activity levels (Narayan and Narayan, 2006). 
The chosen data frequency and sample period can be justified in two folds: First, high-frequency 
data have been shown to produce a more reliable inference on the temporal relations behind the revenue-
expenditure nexus in South Africa, in contrast to the inaccurate inference from annual data (Ndahriwe 
and Gupta, 2010). Second, the chosen sample period allows us to account for the influence of 
developments in both the global and national levels on the pattern of fiscal balance from both the supply 
and demand side, which may cause structural breaks in the selected economic and financial variables. 
Failure to account for possible structural breaks due to significant political and social changes could 
bias the results of our multivariate model.  
Before testing whether the variables are cointegrated, stationarity properties of the series should 
be established to avoid spurious regression. Owed to the increasing integration of South Africa into the 
world economy and capital markets, expose the national economy to exogenous economic shocks and 
financial contagion, which in turn, can filter into the provincial economy. Moreover, a close relationship 
exists between unit-roots and structural changes in the economy, which a traditional unit root test, such 
as the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) cannot account for, especially when time-series are trend 
stationary with structural breaks (Hansen, 2001; Perron, 1989). Thus, it is plausible that our chosen 
variables may have structural breaks associated with important global and domestic events18, which 
                                                    
14Linear interpolation technique is used to convert the available annual data to quarterly series solely to avoid 
misspecification due to small sample size, insufficient degrees of freedom and short time period.   
15Audited financial data sourced from various annual Budget Statements, Medium Term Budget  (MTBPS) and 
Provincial Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (IGFR) documents, available at http://www.treasury.gov.za 
16Headline CPI series used to compute the inflation series is obtained from StatsSA, available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?s=consumer+price+index&sitem=publications 
17 The extant empirical literature is inconclusive on the use of real or nominal variables, but our modelling strategy 
follows the those studies using multivariate models, for example, Baghestani and McNown (1994), Payne (1997), 
Narayan and Narayan (2005), Zapf and Payne (2009), Chang and Chiang (2009), and Owoye et al.(2010). To the 
best of our knowledge, no studies have considered inflation as a control variable in a multi-variate set-up.  
18In this study, we suspect co-breaking in the chosen time-series due to, among others: (i) the latest 2007/8 global 
economic recession, which evolved into financial crisis in the Euro area that creates tight economic condition in 
the capital market, (ii) severely weak South African economic growth since 2014, (iii)  the adopted ongoing  fiscal 
consolidation strategy in South Africa since 2014 aimed a
 12 
 
rendered the use of conventional unit root tests inappropriate (see, e.g., Zivot and Andrews, 1992; 
Barnejee et al.1992 and Perron and Vogelsang, 1998 )19. As stated earlier, failure to account for existing 
endogenous break in a time-series can lead to rejection of the presence of a unit root, which may 
otherwise be false (see, Perron, 1989; Islam, 2001).  
It is, therefore, appropriate to test of unit root against the alternative that data is stationary with 
breaks in the deterministic trend. For this purpose, we applied the Zivot and Andrews (1992, hereafter 
ZA) and Phillips-Perron (1997) unit root tests that allow for structural breaks to establish the stationarity 
properties of each variable as well as identify inherent break dates congruent to existing endogenous 
breaks in each series. In particular, the ZA-unit root test can confirm the presence of structural breaks 
in the deterministic trend and also endogenously determine break dates from data, instead of a prior 
fixed date (Perron, 1989). We proceed to apply the ZA Model C (same as, Perron and Vogelsang IO 
Model 2) based on ADF suitable for data with trending data with both intercept and trend breaks. The 
ZA test is described as:  
 1 1 1 1kt t t t t t t t ty DU D DT y y                     (13) 
where ty  is a time series,  indicates the first difference of series, t  is a time-trend, k is the optimal 
leg length to stationarity of ty , t  is the error term. tDU  and tDT   are dummy variables to capture 
trend shift and men shift  respectively, occurring at each possible break date, TB defined as:  
   1     and        0 0t t
if  t >TB t TB if  t >TBDU DTotherwise otherwise
   
    (14) 
Whereas, the Phillips-Peron (PP) unit root test is estimated as follows:  
 t t t ty y          (15) 
Here, t value is associated with the estimated coefficient of  . The series is stationary if  is 
negative and significant. The test is performed both in levels and the first difference of the series to 
establish stationarity. To abstain from a priori fixed dates, we rely on the break dates identified by three 
different unit root tests, that is the ZA, PP and Bai-Perron’s multiple breakpoint unit-roots were carried 
out on each variable, and the results are reported in Table 1.  For robustness check, we also perform a 
multiple breakpoint unit root test on the estimated OLS regression in Eqs. (1) and (2)20, and the results 
are provided in Tables B1 to B5 in the Appendix.  
Possible break dates identified using all the unit root tests for each series are summarised as follows: 
2009Q1 and 20011Q2 for government revenues; 2006Q1 and 2006Q2 for government expenditures; 
2009Q2 and 2017Q2 for real GDP; and 2010Q3, 2016Q1 and 2015Q2 for inflation. Whereas, the results 
of the multiple breakpoint tests carried out on the OLS regression in Eqs. (1) and (2) based on sequential 
breaks, recursive partitions and global crisis induced breaks to show more co-breaking in data, which 
typically coincide with shocks associated with the global economic and financial crisis, as well as 
structural endogenous shocks that occurred in the South African economy due to, for example, political 
uncertainty, fiscal and economic policies.  Thus, for parsimony and robustness, dummy variables are 
constructed to capture the existing breaks in the data.  
Because our sample period covers notable structural changes in the South African economy, for 
example, the inception of the intergovernmental fiscal framework (IGFR) in the post-apartheid era (i.e., 
2002) by the National Treasury to effectively manage the distribution of fiscal resources (national 
                                                    
expanding fiscal debt (% of GDP) that is currently above 58% (quote), and (iv) decline in revenue generated since 
2017 (Fig.3). 
19See, e.g., Perron (2017, 2006) for useful literature on dealing with structural break issue in time-series.  
20The OLS equations are estimated in levels (excluding dummies). The multiple breaking point unit root test is 
developed based on theoretical contributions of  ZA (1992), Baneerjee et al.(1992), Volgesang and Perron (1998) 
and Perron (1998), among others. This test is carried out in Eviews 10.  
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revenue collected) to sub-national spheres of government; the latest global economic and financial crisis 
(2007-2012); and the implementation of strict fiscal consolidation strategy since 2013 to curb wasteful 
spending, rising government expenditure and stimulate economic growth. These significant events and 
evolution in the South African economy were accounted for by estimating four dummy variables: (i) 
full impact of the global economic recession and financial contagion over the period: 2008Q1–2012Q2, 
(ii) period of a synchronised economic downturn in Africa, from 2009Q1–2011Q421, (iii) sharp fall in 
South African economic activity during the period 2009Q1–2010Q4 before recovery at the beginning 
of 2011,  and (iv) the ongoing strict fiscal consolidation period to enforce prudent financial management 
and good governance for the period 2013Q1–2018Q4. It is worth noting that the constructed dummy 
variables also capture the identified different break dates by the novel unit root tests applied.   
 
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We begin our analysis by considering the stationarity properties of the variables. The results of the unit 
root test unequivocally show that the null hypothesis of unit root with a structural break for most of the 
time-series variables cannot be rejected at levels, but stationarity is achieved after first differencing. 
Note, only the inflation series is expected to be stationary in levels, while other variables are  I(1) 
stationary with endogenous structural breaks.    
 
Table 1. Results of structural breaks unit root test (2004Q2–2018Q1) 
Variables ln GR   ln GR   ln GE    ln GE    2 lnGE  ln Y    ln Y    2 ln Y        
ZA structural unit root test (t-statistic) 
Intercept  -4.699*** -5.128** -4.275 -5.484*  -4.83*** -3.371  -8.181* -3.242 
break dates 2009Q2 2010Q2 2007Q2 2007Q2  2011Q2 2009Q2  2007Q4 2006Q2 
Trend  -3.971 -2.641 -4.112 -4.473**  -3.586   -7.631* -3.185 
break dates 2009Q4 2013Q1 2011Q1 2007Q3  2008Q2   2008Q3 2006Q3 
Intercept and trend  -6.211 -5.548**    -4.677 -3.687  -8.188* -4.788 
break dates 2009Q2 2010Q2    2011q2 2009Q2  2007Q4 2008Q2 
Phillips-Perron unit root  (t-statistic) 
Intercept  -1.006 -2.608*** -0.028 -2.438 -7.275* 0.837 -2.560 -7.281* -2.283 7.284** 
Intercept and trend   -1.499 -2.647 -2.347 -2.485 -7.207* -2.908 -2.493 -7.249* -2.362 7.426** 
Bai-Perron multiple breakpoint test.  
Intercept            
F-statistic    -4.571**    -8.056* -4.955*  
break dates    2006Q1    2009 2 2010Q3  
t-statistic    -4.571**    -8.056* -4.672*  
break dates    2006Q1    2009Q2 2016Q1  
Intercept and trend             
F-statistics -9.579* -5.678*  -6.119*    -7.940* -5.856*  
break dates 2009Q1 2011Q1  2006Q1    2017Q2 2015Q1  
t-stat -9.579* -5.678*  -6.119*    -7.940* -5.856*  
break dates 2009Q1 2011Q1  2006Q1    2017Q2 2015Q1  
Note: *,**,*** denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistically significance levels, respectively. p-values in ( ) parenthesis. 
                                                    
21The recessionary effect of the global crisis on many African countries including South Africa that begun in 2007 
lasted up to 2010, followed by economic recovery in 2011 due to strong demand for commodity export (main 
component of Africa countries export) from emerging market economies, particularly the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China) group led by China, as well as the adopted counter-fiscal strategy by investing in large infrastructure 
projects financed with concessional loans from China (IMF, 2009, Arief et al.2010).  
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5.1. Cointegration and Direction of Causality.  
Having confirmed that variables are I(1) stationary, the next step is to examine whether variables 
are cointegrated, that is, if a long-run relationship exists among variables before assessing the direction 
of causal links among variables using the vector error correction modelling approach. The Johansen’s 
(1992,1995) reduced-rank procedure is applied to establish whether variables are linearly cointegrated. 
The set of information criteria used unanimously to select an optimal lag length of 2, as reported in 
Table 222, and Table 3  presents the numbers of cointegrating ranks based on the trace and maximum 
eigenvalue test statistics at 95% significance level. Both test statistics suggest the existence of at least 
one cointegrated vector (or cointegration equation) between variables at a 5% significance level.  
Table 2. Optimal lag selection for the cointegration test based on information criteria. 
Lag length LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 462.811 NA 0.000 -17.993 -17.841 -17.935 
1 841.789 683.647 0.000 -32.227 -31.469 -31.938 
2 903.672 101.925* 1.99e-20* -34.026* -32.662* -33.505* 
3 909.313 8.405 3.08e-20 -33.620 -31.650 -32.867 
4 916.589 9.703 4.61e-20 -33.278 -30.702 -32.294 
5 928.623 14.157 5.96e-20 -33.122 -29.941 -31.907 
Note: (*) indicates lag order selected by the criterion.  LR, FPE, AIC, SC and HQ denote sequentially modified 
LR test statistic (each test at 5% level); Final prediction error; Akaike information criterion; Schwarz 
information criterion; and Hannan-Quinn information criterion, respectively.   
 
Table 3. Results of VAR-based Johansen unrestricted cointegration rank tests.   
H0 H1 Test statistics  Critical Values (95%) p-value 
Trace Statistics 
0r   1r   48.555 47.856 0.042 
1r   2r   19.543 29.797 0.454** 
2r   3r   7.305 15.494 0.542 
Maximum Eigenvalue Statistics 
0r   1r   29.0114 27.584 0.032 
1r   2r   12.239 21.131 0.524** 
2r   3r   7.216 14.264 0.463 
Note: p-values based on MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). *,**,*** denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistically 
significance levels, respectively.  
 
Since the cointegration test suggests the existence of one linear relationship between the variables 
in the long run; the error correction models specified Eqs. (9) and (10) were estimated to determine the 
long-run and temporal causative processes driving the government revenue–expenditure nexus for the 
Free State province. Before deducing inferences from the models, the dynamic stability estimated error 
correction models were assessed using the stability test introduced by Brown et al. (1975), and the 
results are displayed in Figs. B1 and B2  (in the Appendix) which shows that both parameters and 
variance of the model are dynamically stable under both cumulative sum (CUSUM) and CUSUM of 
the square tests at a 5% significance level. By implication, obtain results of the estimated error 
correction models has economic meaning and can be used to draw a robust conclusion on the direction 
of causal links between variables.   
The evidence of long-run relationship existing among variables from the cointegration analysis 
is validated in the estimated VECMs, and the cointegration equations are represented as:   
                                                    
22The selection criteria are log-likelihood ratio, sequential modified LR test statistic (at 5% significance level), 
Final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), and Schwarz information criterion (SIC) and 
Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information. 
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 1 1 1 1ln 0.551 0.419 ln 0.019ln 0.004 ln                              [-4.976]              [2.222]         [2.612]   
t t t tGR GE Y          (16) 
 
1 1 1 1ln 3.02 0.94ln 0.11ln 0.02 ln
                             [3.472]            [7.058]       [7.015]
        
t t t tGE GR Y       
  (17) 
where, t-stats are in [ ] parenthesis. Note, Eq.(16) shows a positive relationship between 
government revenue and expenditure, consistent with the tax-spend thesis of Friedman (1978). 
According to Eq.(16), a one percent increase in the provincial government revenue will raise 
government expenditure by nearly 0.42% in the long-run and leads to marginal fall in economic activity 
and inflation by 0.01% and 0.004% respectively. On the contrary, the relationship between government 
revenue and expenditure in Eq.(17) exhibits an inverse relationship, aligning with Buchanan and 
Wagner (1977) postulation on the same tax-spend hypothesis. By interpretation, Eq.(17) suggests that 
a one percent increase in government expenditure exert negative effects on government revenue (-
0.94%), economic activity (-0.11%) and inflation (-0.02%). Conclusively, these inferences are 
economically relevant and robust given the statistically significant t-statistics values at 5% level.  
Strikingly, the inferred asymmetric (non-linear) relationship driving the government revenue-
expenditure nexus in the Free State province is rather unsurprising. In reference to  Ewing et al. (2006), 
typical asymmetric cointegration between government revenues and expenditures can be attributed to: 
(i) the differentiated response of the provincial government to either positive or negative changes in 
fiscal disequilibrium that arises from disproportionate revenue or expenditure levels, (ii) changes in 
taxpayers behaviour to higher tax rate or tax base, and (iii) the existence of a close link between the 
business cycle and budget due to the presence of automatic stabilizers, which can cause cyclical 
fluctuation in budgetary components such as government revenues and expenditures in response to 
cyclical changes in the business cycle (Ewing et al. 2006:191). The asymmetric relationship between 
government revenues and expenditures for South Africa has been confirmed in recent studies (see, e.g., 
Phiri, 2019 and Baharumshah et al. 2016). Elsewhere, see, Saunoris and Payne (2010) and  Zapf and 
Payne (2009) for similar studies.  
Next, we turn to the results of the error correction models reported in Table 4. As expected, the 
error correction terms of both the government revenue equation ( )F GR GE   and ( )F GE GR    are 
negative and statistically significant at 5% level, affirming the existence of a stable and long-run 
relationship among variables in both models. Also, these results suggest a bi-directional long-run 
causality from government revenue to expenditure and vice-versa, running interactively through real 
GDP and inflation. This finding suggests the dominance of fiscal synchronicity hypothesis underpins 
the relationship between government revenue and expenditure in the Free State province, keeping in 
line with the reported findings by Phiri (2019), Baharumshah et al. (2016), Ghartey (2010), Lusiyan 
and Thornton (2007) and Nyamongo et al. (2007) for South Africa, but at odds with mixed results 
documented in earlier cross-sectional studies which support institutional separation or neutrality 
hypothesis (Narayan and Narayan, 2008) and  Spend-Tax hypothesis (Chang, et al.2002) underpinning 
the causal relationship between revenue and expenditure for South Africa.  
Additionally, the coefficients of the one-period lagged error correction terms are significantly 
negative in both dynamic models, but with a varying speed of adjustment to restore fiscal disequilibrium 
following a shock to the system. Although, the ate of adjustment to restore equilibrium may appear to 
be relatively slow in both models, nonetheless, fiscal disequilibrium (or imbalance) is corrected by 26% 
in the ( )F GR GE model compared to a much slower adjustment of about 11% in the ( )F GE GR
model, in each quarter. The empirical results reveal that the real government expenditure, real GDP and 
inflation individually Granger causes government revenue in the long-run in the ( )F GR GE  model 
given their statistical significance at 5% level with corresponding significant t -statistics at 1% levels. 
The result on block causality based on the significant F  statistic value (at 5% level) suggests 
that the independent variables (i.e., real government expenditure, real GDP and inflation rate) jointly 
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Granger causes government revenue in the long-run.  In contrast, there is no evidence supporting long-
run causality individually or jointly, from the independent variables to government expenditure in the 
( )F GE GR model.   
 
Table 4. Long-run Granger causality based on the estimated VEC models with dummy variables.  
VEC Model 1: GR GE   VEC Model 2: GE GR  
 ln GR  p-values   ln GE   p-values 
0  0.0001 [0.508] 0.000*   0  -0.003 [-4.238] 0.000* 
2 1ln tECM    -0.256 [-4.125] 0.000* 
 
1 1ln tECM   -0.107 [-2.991] 0.005* 
4ln tGR    -0.2556  [-1.839] 0.039** 
 
1ln tGR   -0.331 [-1.870] 0.071*** 
1ln tGE    0.271 [1.995] 0.054** 
 
1ln tGE   0.464 [3.229] 0.003* 
4ln tY   -0.056 [-2.387] 0.023** 
 
4ln tGE   -0.641 [-5.037] 0.000* 
3ln t   0.001 [2.192] 0.036** 
 
1t (xdum01) 0.005 [4.716] 0.000* 
5 t  (xdum02) 0.001* 0.000*  2 t (dd4) 0.005 [6.651] 0.000* 
6 t  (dd4) 0.000* 0.044**  3t  (dfcon) 0.005 [4.142] 0.000* 
 
Post-estimation diagnostic 
tests  VEC Model 1 
 VEC Model 2   
F-statistic  9.331(0.000)*  
14.829 
(0.000)**   
Adjusted 2R    0.759  0.846   
Jarque-Bera  3.975 (0.136)  4.978 (0.082)   
BG Serial Correlation LM   2.603 (0.272)  2.062 (0.363)   
ARCH  2.355 (0.124)  0.088 (0.765)   
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  27.695 (0.186)  9.137 (0.995)   
Note: *,**,*** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 0 and 0  denotes constant parameters, p-values 
for BG LM test, ARCH and BPG test are in (  ) parenthesis with asymptotic values 2 2*Obs R  .  
 
Whereas, the temporal causal link among variables is established in the VECM by applying the 
standard F  statistic (or WALD) test, and the results are reported in Table 5. Empirical results show 
that government revenue Granger causes government expenditure, and vice-versa, suggesting a bi-
directional causality in the short run consistent with the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. This result 
supports the findings of earlier studies that employ advanced econometric techniques such as vector 
error correction (Nyamongo et al.2007), autoregressive distributed lag (Baharumshah et al.2016, 
Ghartey, 2010)  and momentum threshold autoregressive (Phiri, 2019) models for South Africa. 
Elsewhere, Owoye et al. (2010) also found short-run fiscal synchronization hypothesis driving the 
government revenue-expenditure nexus in five European countries, using the ARDL approach during 
the period  1970 to 2008.  
There is also evidence for unidirectional short-run causality from control variables to government 
revenue in the ( )F GR GE model only, where the real GDP and inflation individually Granger-causes 
government revenue in the short run, without any feedback effect. This inference corroborates the result 
of the block causality ( F  statistic) test performed on the cointegrated variables in the ( )F GR GE
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model (Table 4), which confirm the important roles of the control variables, that is, real economic 
growth and inflation on revenue generation in the FS province. Intuitively, an economic boom that 
raises aggregate consumption expenditure would lead to an increase in revenue collected, while 
inflation rate determines the growth rate of revenue collected over a period of time.  Meanwhile, 
government revenue Granger cause expenditure in the ( )F GE GR model.  
 
Table 5. F  test result on temporal Granger causality from the estimated VEC models. 
Models ( )F GR GE  ( )F GE GR   
Variables lnGR  lnGE   Direction of causality 
1ln tGR   – 3.498 (0.071)* GR  GE 
1ln tGE   3.998 (0.054)** – GE GR 
2ln tY   5.699 (0.023)** – Y  GR 
4ln t   4.805 (0.036)** –  GR 
Note: *,**,*** denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistically significance levels, respectively. p-values in ( ) parenthesis.  
 
Finally,  for robustness, the VECM-based causality analysis is complemented with the MWALD 
(i.e., non-Granger causality) test procedure developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). As explained 
earlier, the T-Y non-Granger causality approach focuses on the long-run causal relationship among the 
variables estimated in levels in a VAR max( )thk d model, hence, no short-run causality exists. The 
results of the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality tests are reported in Table 6.   
Broadly speaking, the non-Granger causality corroborates the long-run causality results obtained 
from the computed VECM-based model, which shows that real government expenditure, real GDP and 
inflation Granger causes government revenue in the long-run. Equally, the results also confirm results 
suggest long-run unidirectional causality from government revenue to government expenditures in the 
Free State province. Interestingly, the result of the T-Y non-Granger causality reinforces previous 
findings on the important role of both economic growth and inflation on government revenue and 
expenditure.  
 
Table 6. Granger non-causality test using the T-Y approach. 
 F  statistic value p-value Long-run causality 
GR→GE 10.728 0.2181 No 
GE→GR 14.681 0.065* Yes 
GR→Y 3.986 0.858 No 
Y→GR 14.648 0.066* Yes 
GE→Y 12.907 0.115 No 
Y→GE 5.942 0.354 No  →GE 30.500 0.000* Yes 
GR→  7.344 0.049 No  →GR 15.765 0.045** Yes  →Y 17.121 0.028* Yes 
GE→  14.005 0.081* Yes 
Y→  8.834 0.356 No 
Note: *,**,*** denote 1%, 5% and 10% statistically significance levels, respectively. p-values in ( ) parenthesis. 
Optimal lag (of 9) is selected using log-likelihood ratio, LR, AIC, FPR, SC and HQ information criteria. All 
residuals were checked for white noise using several misspecification tests. 
In particular, further empirical evidence shows that inflation Granger causes government 
expenditure, revenue and economic growth in the long-run without any feedback effect, while a 
unidirectional long-run causality runs from economic growth to government revenue. This finding is 
consistent with the widely accepted notion that government’s revenue and expenditure are both 
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dependent on the level of economic activity (Narayan and Narayan, 2006), and the Buchanan-Wagner 
hypothesis which stressed indirect taxation through inflation, direct taxation and debt issuance as key 
sources of financing government expenditure. On this premise, the optimal level of revenue sources to 
finance a given expenditure level depends on their relative costs from a political perspective, however, 
an increase in revenue collection (via direct taxation) may lead to a reduction in government 
expenditures, if there is a reduction in the forms of indirect taxation, that is, a reduction in debt issuance 
and bracket creep (see, Payne, 2003:304).  
Taken together, our findings from both causality analysis provide concrete support for the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis in the Free State province in both the short-and long-run dynamics, 
consistent with the findings of, for example, Phiri (2019), Baharumshah et al. (2016), Ghartey 2010 and 
Lusinyan and Thornton (2007) for South Africa; Takumah (2014) for Ghana; Al-zeaud (2015) for 
Jordan; Chang et al. (2002) for Canada; Elyasi and Rahimi (2012) for Iran.  
 
6. Conclusion and some policy recommendation.  
 
This study contributes to the empirical literature by examining the long-run and short-run causal 
relationships between government revenue and government expenditure in the Free State province over 
the period 2004Q2–2018Q1, using real GDP and inflation as control variables in a multivariate model. 
Specifically, we employ the VAR-based Johansen reduced-rank cointegration and vector error 
correction model to establish the nature and the direction of the long-run and temporal between 
government revenue and government expenditure. For robustness, we also utilize the robust Toda-
Yamamoto (1995) non-Granger causality test to confirm the direction of long-run causality 
underpinning the government revenue–expenditure nexus.   
Our main findings are summarized as follows: Firstly, the performed cointegration test suggest the 
existence of a stable long-run relationship between government revenue, government expenditure, real 
GDP and inflation in the Free State province. We also find the coefficient of the error correction term 
to be statistically significant and negative in both the revenue and expenditure equations, providing 
concrete support for the existing long-run relationship among variables. The results of the error 
correction model show a slow adjustment process, ranging from 11% to 26% every quarter to restore 
fiscal disequilibrium in the aftermath of a shock to the provincial economy. Secondly, concerning the 
long-run and temporal causal patterns, we find evidence of bi-directional causality running, 
interactively through the control variables, from government revenue to government expenditure, and 
vice-versa in both the long-run and short-run, supporting the fiscal synchronisation hypothesis. This 
empirical evidence implies that government revenue and expenditure are independent of one another, 
and the provincial government have control over generated revenue (via tax imposition) and 
expenditure as fiscal tools to restore budgetary equilibrium.   
Finally, we find that economic growth and inflation rate plays an important role in ‘own’ revenue 
raised in the province. Taken together, the causal analysis shows that real GDP and inflation 
individually Granger-causes government revenue in the long run. In the short run, there is a 
unidirectional causality running from real GDP to government revenue, and inflation Granger causes 
government revenue and expenditure, without any feedback effect.  
These findings have some important policy implications. Firstly, the evidence for fiscal 
synchronicity underlying the government revenue–expenditure nexus suggests that fiscal pressures or 
budget constraints linked to budget deficit could be alleviated by raising revenue via taxes (i.e., 
surcharges and levies) and cut in government expenditure. Albeit, rapid growth in government 
expenditure relative to government revenue would not only limit fiscal space, cause fiscal imbalance 
and heightened (adverse) budgetary pressures at the provincial level, but can exacerbate fiscal debt at 
the national level.  In the context, the Provincial Treasury should adopt stringent measures to improve 
the current budgetary stance of the province to facilitate fiscal prudence, sound financial management, 
adequate budget planning process, implementation of a credible budget and eradicate fruitless 
expenditure. Secondly, given the empirical evidence that provincial government revenue and 
expenditure are dependent on the growth rate of economic activity level and inflation, hence 
policymakers and fiscal authorities should consider the implications of raising government revenue (via 
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tax imposition) or expenditure, especially on economic activity level in the province. Intuitively, an 
accommodative fiscal stance that stimulates provincial economic growth has the potential to increase 
government revenue, in contrast, high government expenditure that heightens inflationary pressure will 
crowd out economic growth (or economic gains). Same policy prescription applies to a conservative 
fiscal stance to reduce government expenditure and revenue (by lowering taxes or phasing out certain 
surcharges and levies).  
Finally, the empirical findings in this study stressed the need for implementation of effective policy 
to drive turn-around strategies in the short-term and medium-term, at the provincial level.  In this regard, 
the Free State provincial government (FSPG) can consider the following strategies: First, the provincial 
government should intensify its revenue-raising effort by prioritizing the implementation of fiscal 
strategies aimed at stimulating government revenues through its Provincial Treasury.   
Second, FSPG needs to harness the revenue-generating autonomy of the provincial government, 
through the Provincial Treasury,  to broaden its revenue collection (or tax) base to prevent revenue 
slippage, for example, by extending revenue collection to untaxed informal sector activities. In the same 
vein, policymakers should consider new revenue-generating measures to raise revenue via: (a) 
imposition of surcharges and levies on property development and constructed weighbridges, (b) leasing 
of municipal (and communal) lands to property developers and potential large-scale farmers, (c) 
conduct asset audit to identify unused provincial government buildings which can be renovated and 
leased to companies for office spaces.  
Third, it is also important for the provincial government to increase public investment in tourism 
given the unique geographical location of the Free State province, as an in-land transit route to major 
economic hubs in the country, notably Gauteng and Western Cape provinces) in the country. Lastly, 
FSPG should prioritize fiscal prudence by improving value-for-money on each rand spent on 
implemented infrastructure projects by carrying out a thorough feasibility study, and the use of cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) models to determine the profitability (i.e., return on investment, ROI) of 
executed projects. These remedial actions can significantly reduce fruitless expenditure and high-cost 
overruns on projects, at the same time, improve the expected ROI on executed projects, the quality and 
service delivery of publicly demanded goods. 
In future research, it would be interesting to build on the empirical work in this paper by 
investigating whether the evidence of fiscal synchronization underlying the government revenue–
expenditure nexus for the Free State province holds by employing an asymmetric (non-linear) 
econometric model. This is crucial since macroeconomic variables are non-linear as well as the 
plausibility of the differentiated responses of fiscal disequilibrium that arises from a disproportionate 
government revenue or expenditure levels to either positive or negative innovations, as shown in the 
surveyed recent studies in the previous sections. In the same vein, government revenue and expenditure 
might have been sensitive to cyclical movements in the provincial economy.  
 20 
 
Appendix. See, Fig. 1, 2 and 3. 
Fig.1: Trends of total government revenue, total government expenditure and 
budget imbalance (ratio of GDP) for South Africa, 2001-2019.   
 Data Source: National Treasury, Budget Speech 2020. Author’s illustration.  
 
Fig. 2: Gross fiscal debt (or government loan) for South Africa (% of GDP), 1987-2020.  
Data Source: National Treasury, Budget Speech 2020. Author’s illustration. 
 
Fig.3: Trends of total ‘own’ revenue, total government expenditure and budget 
disequilibrium (ratio of GDP) for Free State, 2004-2019.   
 Data Source: In-Year-Monitoring database (Free State Provincial Treasury) 
supplemented with data from the 2019/20 Estimates of Provincial Revenue 
and Expenditure Trend (Free State Provincial Treasury). Author’s illustration. 
Note: Budget disequilibrium is the estimated from the financial data by the author. 
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Appendix A: Empirical evidence on government revenues-expenditure theories. 
 
Table A1.  A brief survey of previous and recent empirical studies.  
Author(s) Country/ countries Econometric technique  Period Conclusion on direction of causality.  
AbuAl-Foul and Baghestani (2004)  Egypt and Jordan VAR and ECM 
Egypt (1977-
1998), Jordan 
(1975-2001) 
Egypt: GR → GE; Jordan: GE ↔ GR 
Afonso and Rault (2009) 25 EU countries Panel Granger causality tests 1998–2006 
Italy, France, Spain, Greece, Portugal: GE → GR; 
Belgium, Germany, Austria, Finland, UK: GR → GE 
Ali and Shah (2012) Pakistan VECM 1976–2009 GE ≠ GR 
Al-zeaud (2015) Jordan VECM 1990–2011 GE → GR 
Aregbeyen and Ibrahim (2012) Nigeria ARDL 1970–2008 GR → GE 
Blackley (1986) US Granger causality  1929-1982 GE → GR 
Bohn (1991) US ECM 1792–1988 GR → GE 
Chang and Chiang (2009) 15 OECD Panel VAR 1992–2006 GE = GE 
Chang et al. (2002) 10 developed and developing countries ECM 1951–1996 
Japan, Lebanon, South Korea, Taiwan, Tunisia, UK, 
USA: GR → GE; Australia and South Africa: GE → 
GR; Canada: GR ↔ GE; New Zealand and Thailand: 
GE ≠ GR 
Daratt (1998) Turkey VECM 1967–1994 GR → GE 
Eita and Mbazima (2008) Namibia VAR 1977–2007 GR → GE 
Elyasi and Rahimi (2012) Iran  ARDL 1963-2007 GE ↔ GR 
Ewing (2006)  US TAR and MTAR 1958–2003 
Asymmetric cointegration: Revenues and expenditures 
respond to worsening budgets but not to improving 
ones. GE = GE in the short-run GE ↔ GR in the long-
run 
Ewing and Payne (1998) 5 Latin American countries ECM 1950–1994 
Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala: GR → GE; Chile and 
Paraguay: GE ↔ GR 
Source: Authors Compilation. 
Notes: GE represents government expenditures and GR represents government revenue.  Directions of causality: GE → GR: government expenditure Granger causes revenue 
(spend-tax hypothesis); GR → GE: government revenues Granger causes expenditure (tax-spend hypothesis); GE ↔ GR: the existence of bidirectional causality between 
government expenditure and revenues: GE ≠ GR: inexistence of causality between the variables. Methodologies: TAR, MTAR, TVECM, VAR, ECM, UDL, NARDL, ARDL, 
and JJ denote threshold autoregressive and momentum threshold autoregressive models, threshold vector autoregressive, correction model, error correction model, unrestricted 
distributive lag model, nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag model, autoregressive distributive lag model, vector autoregressive model and Johansen-Juselieus cointegration 
test.  
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Table A1. (Continue).  
Islam (2001) US Granger causality tests 1929-1997, GE → GR 
Jones and Joulifain (1991) US ECM 1972–1860 GE → GR 
Kaya and Şen (2013) Turkey VAR and Granger causality  1975-2011 GE → GR 
Keho (2011) Ivory Coast TVECM 1960–2007 Asymmetric cointegration.GR → GE in periods of budget deficit; GE → GR in periods of budget surplus 
Kollias and Paleologou (2006) 15 EU countries VECM 1960–2002 
Portugal: GE = GE; Denmark, Greece, Ireland: 
GE ↔ GR; Netherlands, Portugal Sweden: 
GE ≠ GR; Finland, France, Italy, Spain, UK: 
GR → GE 
Magazzino (2013) 15 ECOWAS countries Granger causality  1980-2011 
GE ↔ GR; Benin; Mali; Niger; Senegal, Togo, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Nigeria; GE → 
GR: Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Cape 
Verde and Sierra-Leone 
Manage and Marlow (1986) US Granger causality test 1929–1982 GE ↔ GR 
Manage and Marlow (1987) US’ state and local government levels. Granger causality test 1952–1982 
GR → GE for aggregate state government level; GE ≠ 
GR for aggregated local government level.  
Masere and Kaja (2014) Zimbabwe  JJ Cointegration and Granger causality tests 
2010:1 to 2012:12 
(monthly data) GE ≠ GR 
Mehrara et al. (2011) 40 Asian countries Panel cointegration and panel causality tests 1995–2008 GE ↔ GR 
Miller and Rusek (1990) US VAR and ECM Post-World War II GE ↔ GR 
Mohanty and Mishra (2017) India VECM 1980/81- 2013/14 GE → GR 
Nwosu and Okafor (2014) Nigeria VAR and VECM 1970–2011 GE → GR 
Obeng (2015) Ghana VAR 1980–2013 GR → GE 
Owoye (1995) 7 European countries ECM 1961–1990 
Ireland: GE ↔ GR; Italy and Japan: GR → GE; 
Canada, France, Germany, UK, USA: GE ↔ GR 
Paleologou (2013) Sweden, Greece and Germany 
TAR and MTAR 
cointegration model 1965–2009 
No asymmetric cointegration in Sweden and 
Germany, GE ↔ GR in both countries; Asymmetric 
cointegration in Greece with GE → GR 
Park (1998) Korea VAR 1964-1962 GR → GE 
Payne (1998) 48 contiguous states in the US ECM 1942-1992 
GR → GE in 24 states; GE → GR in 8 states; GE ↔ 
GR in 11 states 
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Payne (2008)  Turkey TAR and MTAR cointegration model 1968–2004 No asymmetric cointegration, GR → GE 
Rahman and Wadud (2014) Bangladesh  JJ Cointegration and ECM 1973-2013 GR → GE 
Ram (1988)  US Granger causality 1929–1983 GR → GE 
Raza et al.(2019) Pakistan  NARDL 1972–2014. 
Asymmetric relationship.  Negative shocks in the 
revenues cause a larger increase in the expenditures. 
GE ↔ GR 
Ritcher and Dimitrios (2013) Greece JJ Cointegration and Granger causality tests 1833-2009 GE → GR 
Ross and Payne (1998)  US 
Johansen-Juselius (1990) 
cointegration test, ECM 
and ARCH models 
1955:1-1994:2, 
(quarterly) GE → GR 
Saunoris, J.W (2015).  48 contiguous US states 
Pedroni cointegration test 
and ARDL-based ECM 1951 to 2008 GR → GE 
Saunoris and Payne (2010), US TAR and MTAR cointegration model 1955–2009 
Asymmetric cointegration. Revenues and expenditures 
respond to worsening budgets quicker than to 
improving ones. GE → GR over long-run 
Sennoga (2012) 56 districts in Uganda Granger causality tests 2001-2003 GR → GE 
Takumah (2014) Ghana VECM 1986–2012 GE ↔ GR 
Tiwari and Mutascu (2016) Romania TAR and MTAR cointegration model 1999–201 
Asymmetric cointegration. Revenues and expenditures 
respond to worsening budgets quicker than to 
improving ones 
Von Furstenburg et al. (1986) US’ state and local government levels.  VAR 1954:Q1–1982:Q4 
GE → GR for aggregate state and local government 
Levels.  
Wolde-Rufael (2008) 13 African countries VAR 1964–2003 
GE → GR: Burkina Faso; GR → GE: Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Mali, Zambia; GR ↔ GE: Mauritius, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe; GE ≠ GR: Botswana, Burundi, 
Rwanda: 
Zapf and Payne (2009) US TAR and MTAR cointegration model 1959–2005 No asymmetric cointegration 
Source: Authors Compilation. Notes: GE represents government expenditures and GR represents government revenue.  Directions of causality: GE → GR: 
government expenditure Granger causes revenue (spend-tax hypothesis); GR → GE: government revenues Granger causes expenditure (tax-spend hypothesis); 
GE ↔ GR: the existence of bidirectional causality between government expenditure and revenues: GE ≠ GR: inexistence of causality between the variables. 
Methodologies: TAR, MTAR, TVECM, VAR, ECM, UDL, NARDL, ARDL, and JJ denote threshold autoregressive and momentum threshold autoregressive 
models, threshold vector autoregressive, correction model, error correction model, unrestricted distributive lag model, nonlinear autoregressive distributive lag 
model, autoregressive distributive lag model, vector autoregressive model and Johansen-Juselieus cointegration test.  
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Appendix B: Tables B1, B2 and Figures 1, 2 
 
Table B1. Multiple breakpoint tests: Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L sequentially determined breaks. 
Break Test   F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Critical Value Break dates: 
0 vs. 1 * 35.29097 141.1639 16.19 Sequential Repartition 
1 vs. 2 * 35.41123 141.6449 18.11 2009Q2 2006Q2 
2 vs. 3 * 18.49455 73.97822 18.93 2012Q1 2009Q1 
3 vs. 4 * 25.72346 102.8938 19.64 2006Q2 2012Q1 
4 vs. 5 0.429369 1.717478 20.19 2016Q1 2016Q1 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks = 4 
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron (2003). 
 
Table B2. Multiple breakpoint tests: Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions.  
Break Test   Breaks  F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Break dates 
    Sequential Repartition 
0 vs. 1 * 2009Q1 35.29097 141.1639 2009Q2 2006Q3 
1 vs. 2 2003Q4 1.999809 7.999237 2012Q1 2012Q1 
1 vs. 2 * 2011Q4 35.41123 141.6449   
2 vs. 3 --- --- ---   
2 vs. 3 2003Q4 3.513198 14.05279   
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks = 2 
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron ( 2003), 
CV=16.19.  
  
 
Table B3. Multiple breakpoint tests: Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L globally determined breaks.  
Break 
Test F-statistic 
Scaled F-
statistic 
Critical 
Value   Estimated break dates. 
0 vs. 1 * 35.29097 141.1639 16.19  1 2009Q2     
1 vs. 2 * 35.41123 141.6449 18.11  2  2006Q3   2011Q4    
2 vs. 3 * 7.592057 30.36823 18.93  3 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1   
3 vs. 4 * 40.05362 160.2145 19.64  4 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1 2016Q1  
4 vs. 5 0.689171 2.756683 20.19  5 2006Q2 2009Q1 2010Q2 2012Q2 2016Q1 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks = 4  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks = 4  
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron ( 2003).  
 
 
Table B4.  Multiple breakpoint tests:   Bai-Perron tests of L+1 vs. L globally determined breaks.  
Break 
Test F-statistic 
Scaled F-
statistic 
Critical 
Value   Estimated break dates. 
0 vs. 1 * 35.29097 141.1639 16.19  1 2009Q2     
1 vs. 2 * 35.41123 141.6449 18.11  2  2006Q3   2011Q4    
2 vs. 3 * 7.592057 30.36823 18.93  3 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1   
3 vs. 4 * 40.05362 160.2145 19.64  4 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1 2016Q1  
4 vs. 5 0.689171 2.756683 20.19  5 2006Q2 2008Q2 2010Q2 2012Q2 2016Q1 
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks = 4  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks = 4  
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron ( 2003).
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Table B4. Multiple breakpoint tests: Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined breaks.   
Break 
Test 
F-statistic Scaled F-
statistic 
Weighted 
F-statistic 
Critical 
Value 
  Estimated break dates.  
1 * 35.29097 141.1639 141.1639 16.19  1 2009Q2     
2 * 131.1537 524.6147 616.8127 13.77  2 2006Q3   2011Q4    
3 * 170.7400 682.9600 908.5557 12.17  3 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1   
4 * 638.1696 2552.678 3830.200 10.79  4 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1 2016Q1  
5* 4770.570 19082.28 33987.03 9.09  5 2006Q2 2008Q2 2010Q2 2012Q2 2016Q1 
UDMax statistic* = 19082.28                              UDMax critical value** = 16.37 
WDMax statistic*= 33987.03                              WDMax critical value** = 17.83  
Sequential F-statistic determined breaks = 5  
Significant F-statistic largest breaks = 5 
UDmax determined breaks = 5 
WDmax determined breaks = 5 
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron ( 2003).  
 
Table B5. Multiple breakpoint tests: Bai-Perron tests of 1 to M globally determined breaks.   
Breaks 
No. of 
coefficient 
Sum of 
Sq. Residual Log-L 
Schwarz* 
Criterion 
LWZ* 
Criterion  Estimated break dates. 
0 4 0.000881 230.210 -10.772 -10.588 1 2009Q2     
1  9 0.000224 268.609 -11.784 -11.361 2  2006Q3   2011Q4    
2  14 3.55E-05 320.165 -13.266 -12.592 3 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1   
3  19 1.69E-05 340.964 -13.649 -12.711 4 2006Q2 2009Q1 2012Q1 2016Q1  
4  24 3.10E-06 388.443 -14.986 -13.765 5 2006Q2 2008Q2 2010Q2 2012Q2 2016Q1 
5 29 2.95E-07 454.225 -16.976 -15.447       
Schwarz criterion selected breaks = 5   
LWZ criterion selected breaks = 5   
Note: (*)Significant at the 0.05 level. Break test options: Trimming 0.15; Critical values from Bai-Perron ( 2003). 
*Minimum information criterion values displayed with shading     
 
Figure B1. Results of the dynamic  stability for ( )F GR GE  model  
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Note: The CUSUM parameter (and variance) stability test assess the robustness of the specified model, and Fig.B3 show that both 
parameters and variance of the model are stable under both cumulative sum (CUSUM) and CUSUM of the square tests, at 5% 
significance level. 
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Figure B2. Results of the dynamic  stability for ( )F GE GR  model  
CUSUM CUSUM Squared. 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
CUSUM 5% Significance  
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
CUSUM of Squares 5% Significance  
Note: The CUSUM parameter (and variance) stability test assess the robustness of the specified model, and Fig.B3 show that 
both parameters and variance of the model are stable under both cumulative sum (CUSUM) and CUSUM of the square tests, at 
5% significance level.  
 
 
 
References. 
 
AbuAI-Foul, A., & Baghestani, H (2004). The Causal Relation between Government Revenue and 
Spending: Evidence from Egypt and Jordan. Journal of Economics and Finance, 9,2, 260-269. 
Afonso A., & Rault, C. (2009). Bootstrap panel Granger-causality between government spending and 
revenue in the EU. Economic Bulletin, 29:2542–2548.  
Ali R., & Shah, M. (2012). The casual relationship between government expenditure and revenue in 
Pakistan. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in Business, 3:323–329.  
Al-Zeaud, H. A. (2015). The causal relationship between government revenue and expenditure in Jordan. 
International Journal of Management & Business Research, 5(2), pp. 117–127. 
http://ijmbr.srbiau.ac.ir/article_6383.html 
Aregbeyen O., & Ibrahim, T. (2012).  Testing the revenue and expenditure nexus in Nigeria: an 
application of the bound test approach. European Journal of Social Sciences, 27:374–380.  
Arief, A., Weiss, M.A., & Jones, V.C.(2010). The Global Economic Crisis: Impact on Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Global Policy Responses. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 
Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40778.pdf 
Ahsan, S. M., Kwan, A. C., & Sahni, B. (1992). Public Expenditure and National Income Causality: 
Further Evidence on the Role of Omitted Variables. Southern Economic Journal, 58(3), 623-634. 
Baghestani, H., & McNown, R.(1994). Do revenues or expenditures respond to budgetary Disequilibria? 
Southern Economic Journal, 61:311-22. 
Baharumshah, A.Z., Jibrilla, A.A., Sirag, A., Ali, H.S., & Muhammad, I.M. (2016). Public Revenue-
Expenditure Nexus in South Africa: Are there Asymmetries? South African Journal of 
Economics,84:520-537. DOI: 10.1111/saje.12130. 
Bai, J., & Perron. P (2003). Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change Models. Journal 
of Applied Econometrics, 18: 1–22. 
Barnejee, A., Lumsdaine, R.L., & Stock, J.H.(1992). Recursive and Sequential Tests of the Unit-root and 
Trend-break hypotheses: Theory and International Evidence. Journal of Business & Economic 
Statistics, 10, 3, 271-287.  
 27 
 
Blackley P (1986) Causality Between Revenues and Expenditures and the Size of Federal Budget. Public 
Finance Quarterly, 14:139–156. 
Bohn H (1991) Budget balance through revenue or spending adjustments? Some historical evidence for 
the United States. Journal of Monetary Economics, 27:333–359. 
Brown, R.L., J. Durbin, and J.M. Evans (1975). Techniques for testing the constancy of regression 
relationships over time. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological), 37(2): 
149–192. 
Buchanan, J.M., & Wagner, R.W (1978). Dialogues concerning fiscal religion. Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 4:627-636. 
Caporale, G. M., & Pittis, N. (1999). Efficient Estimation of Cointegrating Vectors and Testing for 
Causality in Vector Autoregressions. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13, 3–35. 
Chang, T., & Chiang, G. (2009). Revisiting the Government Revenue-Expenditure Nexus: Evidence from 
15 OECD Countries Based on the Panel Data Approach. Czech Journal of Economics and Finance 
(Finance a úvĕr), 59(2),165-172. 
Chang, T., Liu, W. R. and Caudill, S. B. (2002). Tax-and-Spend, Spend-and-Tax, or Fiscal 
Synchronization: New Evidence for Ten Countries. Applied Economics, 34 (12),1553-1561.  
Clark, J., & Mizzra, S. (2006). Comparison of some common methods for detecting Granger 
Noncausality. Journal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, 76(3), 2017-231.  
Darrat, A. F. (1998). Tax and spend, or spend and tax? An inquiry into the Turkish budgetary process. 
Southern Economic Journal, 64(4), 940–956. DOI:10.2307/1061212 
Darrat, A. F. (2002). Budget Balance Through Spending Cuts or Tax Adjustments? Contemporary 
Economic Policy, 20 (3), 221-233. https://doi.org/10.1093/cep/20.3.221 
Eita, J.H., & Mbazima, D. (2008). The Causal Relationship between Government Revenue and 
Expenditure in Namibia”. Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences, 2(2): 175-186.  
Elyasi, Y., & Rahimi, M. (2012). The Causality between Government Revenue and Government 
Expenditure in Iran. International Journal of Economic Sciences and Applied Research, 5 (1): 
129-145. 
Engle, R. F., and C. W. J. Granger. 1987. Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation 
and Testing. Econometrica, 55:251-76. 
Ewing, B., & Payne, J. (1998). Government revenue-expenditure nexus: Evidence from Latin America. 
Journal of Economic Development, 23, 57–69. 
Ewing, B. T., Payne, J.E., Thompson, M.A., & Al-Zoubi, O.M (2006). Government expenditures and 
revenues: Evidence from Asymmetric Modeling. Southern Economic Journal, 73:190-200. 
Ewing, B., & Payne, J. (1998). Government Revenue-Expenditure Nexus: Evidence from Latin America. 
Journal of Economic Development, 23, 57–69. 
Friedman, M. 1978. The Limitations of Tax Limitation. Policy Review Summer, 5:7-14. 
Ghartey, E. (2010). Cointegration and causal relationship between taxes and spending in Kenya, Nigeria 
and South Africa. International Economic Journal,  24:267–282. 
Gonzalo, J. (1994) Five alternative methods of estimating long-run equilibrium relationships. Journal of 
Econometrics, 60, 203-233. 
Granger, C.W.J., & Lin, J-L. (2005). Causality in the Long run. Econometric Theory, 11, 530-536. 
Hansen, B. E (2001). The New Econometrics of Structural Change: Dating Breaks in U.S. Labour 
Productivity. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (4): 117-128. DOI: 10.1257/jep.15.4.117. 
IMF (2009). Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Sub-Saharan Africa. African Department, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington: DC. Retried from: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/books/2009/afrglobfin/ssaglobalfin.pdf 
IMF (2020). World Economic Outlook database. International Monetary Fund, Washington: DC. 
Accessed January 2020.  
Islam, M.Q.(2001). Structural break, unit root, and the causality between government expenditures and 
revenues. Applied Economics Letters, 8, 565-567. 
 28 
 
Johansen, S. (1988). Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors. Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 12, 231-254. 
Johansen, S., & Juselius. K (1990). Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on cointegration: With 
applications to the demand for money. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics (May): 169-
210. 
Johansen, S. (1992). Cointegration in partial systems and the efficiency of single-equation analysis. 
Journal of Econometrics, 52 (3), 389–402. 
Johansen, S. (1995). Likelihood-based inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive Models. Oxford 
University Press.  
Jones, J. D., & Joulfaian. D (1991). Federal government expenditures and revenues in the early years of 
the American republic: Evidence from 1792-1860. Journal of Macroeconomics, 13(1):133-55. 
Kavase, K., & Phiri, A.(2018). Are fiscal budgets sustainable in South Africa? Evidence from provincial 
level data. Business and Economic Horizons, 14(2),415-423. ISSN: 1804-5006. 
Kaya, A., & Şen, H. (2013). How to achieve and sustain fiscal discipline in Turkey: Rising Taxes, 
reducing government spending or a combination of both? Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy, 
4(1),1-26. ISSN 2069-0983. Retrieved from  http://hdl.handle.net/10419/107948 
Keho Y (2010) Budget balance through revenue or spending adjustments? An econometric analysis of 
the Ivorian budgetary process: 1960–2005. Journal of Economics and International Finance, 2:1–
11. 
Kollias C., & Paleologou S (2006) Fiscal policy in the European Union: tax and spend, spend and tax, 
fiscal synchronization or institutional separation? Journal of Economic Studies, 33:108–120. 
Kremers, J. M., Erisccos, N. R., & Dolado, J. J. (1992). The Power of Cointegration Tests. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54, 325-346. 
Lusinyan L., & Thornton, J. (2007). The revenue-expenditure nexus: historical evidence for South Africa. 
South African Journal of Economics, 75:496–507. 
Lutkepohl, H. 1982. Non-causality due to omitted variables. Journal of Econometrics, 19:367-78. 
Magazzino, C (2013). Revenue expenditure nexus: a case study of ECOWAS. Open-Assessment E-
Journal, 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2013-13 7:1–27. 
Manage, N. & Marlow, M. (1986). The Causal Relationship between Federal Expenditure and Receipts. 
Southern Economic Journal, 52(1), 617-629. 
Marlow, M. L., and N. Manage. 1987. Expenditures and receipts: Testing for causality in state and local 
government finances. Public Choice, 53:243-55. 
Masere, V.S., & Kaja, P. (2014). An Investigation of the Relationship between Government Expenditure 
and Revenue in a Multicurrency Economy: A Case of Zimbabwe. Journal of Economics and 
Sustainable Development, 5(14), 104-110. ISSN 2222-2855.  
Mehrara, M., Pahlavani, M., & Elyasi, Y. (2011). Government Revenue and Government Expenditure 
Nexus in Asian Countries: Panel Cointegration and Causality. International Journal of Business 
and Social Science, 2(7),199-207. 
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S.F (1981).  A rational theory of the size of the government. Journal of 
Political Economy, 89:914-27. 
Miller, S. M., & Russek. S.F. (1989). Co-integration and Error-Correction Models: The Temporal 
Causality Between Government Taxes and Spending. Southern Economic Journal, 57:221-29. 
Musgrave, R. A. 1966. Principles of budget determination. In Cameron, A.H., & Henderson, W (eds.), 
Public finance: Selected readings, 15-27. New York: Random House. 
Narayan, P. K., & Narayan, S. (2006). Government revenue and government expenditure nexus: 
Evidence from developing countries. Applied Economics, 38(3), 285–291.  
National Treasury (2020). National Budget Speech. South Africa: Pretoria. 26 February 2020. 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2020/default.aspx 
Ndahiriwe, K., & Gupta, R (2010). Temporal causality between taxes and public expenditures: the case 
of South Africa. The Journal of World Economic Review, 6:87–100. 
 29 
 
NDP (2012). National Development Plan 2030. The Presidency, National Planning Commission. South 
Africa, Pretoria. Available at https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030 
NGP (2011). New Growth Path Framework. National Department of Economic Development. South 
Africa, Pretoria. Available at http://www.economic.gov.za/communications/publications/new-
growth-path-series 
Nwosu D, Okafor H (2014) Government revenue and expenditure in Nigeria: a disaggregate analysis. 
Asian Economic and Financial Review, 4:877–892. 
Nyamongo M, Sichei M., & Schoeman, N. (2007). Government revenue and expenditure nexus in South 
Africa. South African Journal of Economic Management Sciences, 10:256–268 
Obeng S (2015) A Causality Test of the Revenue-Expenditure Nexus in Ghana. ADRRI Journal of Arts 
and Social Sciences, 11(11),1-19. ISSN: 2343-6891.  
Owoye, O., & Onafowora, O. A. (2010). The relationship between tax revenues and government 
expenditures in European Union and non-European Union OECD countries. Public Finance 
Review, 39(3), 429–461. DOI:10.1177/1091142110386211. 
Paleologou S (2013) Asymmetries in the Revenue-Expenditure Nexus: A Tale of Three Countries. 
Economic Modelling, 30:52–60. 
Park, W.K. (1998). Granger Causality between Government Revenues and Expenditures in Korea. 
Journal of Economic Development, 23(1), 145-155.  
Payne, J. E. (1998). The Tax-Spend Debate: Time Series Evidence from State Budgets. Public Choice, 
95, 307-320.  
Payne, J. E. (2003). A Survey of The International Empirical Evidence on the Tax-Spend Debate. Public 
Finance Review, 31:302-24. 
Payne, J. E., Mohammadi, H., & Cak, M. (2008). Turkish Budget Deficit Sustainability and The Revenue 
Expenditure Nexus. Applied Economics, 40, 7: 823-830. 
Peacock, A. T., & Wiseman, J. (1961). The Growth of Public Expenditure in the United Kingdom. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for the Bureau of Economic Research.  
Peacock, A. T., & Wiseman, J. (1979). Approaches to the Analysis of Government Expenditure Growth. 
Public Finance Quarterly, 7:3-23. 
Perron, P. (1989). The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and the Unit root Hypothesis. Econometrica, 
57:1361-401. 
Perron, P. (2006). Dealing with Structural Breaks. Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics, 1, 278-352. 
Perron, P. (2017). Unit Roots and Structural Breaks. Econometrics, 5, 22; 1-3. 
DOI:10.3390/econometrics5020022. 
 Phillips, P. C., & Perron, P. (1988). Testing for Unit Root in Time Series Regression. Biometrica, 75, 
335-346. 
Phiri, A. (2019). Asymmetries in the revenue–expenditure nexus: new evidence from South Africa. 
Empirical Economics, 56, 1515–1547. 
Rahman, S.M.A., & Wadud, M.A (2014). Tax and Spend, Spend and Tax, Fiscal Synchronization or 
Fiscal Neutrality: Evidence from Bangladesh. The International Journal of Applied Economics 
and Finance, 8 (3), 98-108. DOI: 10.3923/ijaef.2014.98.108. 
Ram, R.(1988). Additional evidence on causality between government revenue and government 
expenditure. Southern Economic Journal, 54:763–769.  
Raza, S.A.., Hassan, S. Z., & Sharif, A.(2019). Asymmetric Relationship Between Government Revenues 
and Expenditures in a Developing Economy: Evidence from a Non-linear Model. Global Business 
Review, 20 (5): 1179-11951–17. DOI: 10.1177/0972150919846800 
Ritcher, C., & Dimitrios, P. (2013). Tax and spend, spend and tax, fiscal synchronisation or institutional 
separation? Examining the case of Greece. Romanian Journal of Fiscal Policy, 4(2), 1-17. 
Ross, K. L., & Payne, J.E. (1998). A Reexamination Of Budgetary Disequilibria. Public Finance Review,  
26 (1): 67-79. 
 30 
 
Saunoris, J.W.(2015). The Dynamics of the Revenue–Expenditure Nexus: Evidence from US State 
Government Finances. Public Finance Review, 43(1):108-134. 
Saunoris J. W., & Payne, J.E (2010) Tax more or spend less? Asymmetries in the UK revenue-
expenditure nexus. Journal of Policy Modeling, 32(4): 478–487. 
Sennoga, E. (2008). Local government revenues and expenditures in Uganda: A VAR approach. 
Makerere University, Uganda: Kampala. Retrieved from: 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.559.9385&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
Singh, B., & Sahni, B. S. (1984). Causality Between Public Expenditure and National Income. The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 66(4), 630-644. 
StatsSA (2020). Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) for 2019:Q4. P0211. Statistics South Africa. 
South Africa: Pretoria. 11 February 2020. Available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1854&PPN=P0211&SCH=7622 
Stock, J.H., & Watson, M.W.(1988). Variable Trends in Economic Time Series. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2:147-174. 
Takumah, W. (2014). Cointegration and Causality Between Tax Revenue and Economic Growth in 
Ghana. International Research Journal of Marketing and Economics, 1(6), 30–44. ISSN 2349-
0314. 
Tiwari A., & Mutascu, M. (2016). The Revenues-Spending Nexus in Romania: a TAR and MTAR 
Approach. Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 29(1):735–745. 
Toda, H. Y., & Yamamoto, T. (1995). Statistical inference in vector autoregressions with possibly 
integrated processes. Journal of Econometrics, 66:225-50. 
Vogelsang, T.J., & Perron, P. (1998). Additional Tests for a Unit Root Allowing for a Break in the Trend 
Function at an Unknown Time. International Economic Review, 39, 4, 1073-1100. 
Von Furstenberg, G. M., Green, R. J., & Jeong, J.(1985). Tax and spend, or spend and tax? Review of 
Economics and Statistics,  68 (2): 179-88. 
Wildavsky, A. (1988). The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman. 
Wolde-Rufael, Y. (2006). The Revenue–Expenditure Nexus: The Experience of 13 African Countries. 
African Development Review, 20(2), 273-283. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8268.2008.00185.x 
Zapata, H., & Rambaldi, A. (1997). Monte Carlo Evidence on Cointegration and Causation. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 59: 285-298. 
Zapf, M., and J. E. Payne. 2009. Asymmetric Modelling of the Revenue-Expenditure  Nexus: Evidence 
from Aggregate State and Local Government in the US. Applied Economics Letters, 16:871-876.  
Zivot, E., & Andrews, D. W. K. (1992). Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock and 
the Unit root Hypothesis. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 10: 251-270. 
